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INSURABLE INTEREST IN TEXAS

T

HE almost universal rule adopted by the courts is that a

person having no insurable interest in the life of another may
not procure a policy on the latter's life; if he does, the policy is void
as to such beneficiary as a wagering contract and against public
policy.' Texas courts have stated that the primary basis for the
requirement of insurable interest is to prevent any incentive to
bring about the premature death of the insured. In the case of
Cheeves v. Anders2 Associate Justice Brown summed up the attiude of the Texas courts as follows:
In some states it is held that an element of wagering likewise enters
into such contracts, which has led, as we believe, to inconsistencies in
the decisions in some of the courts. Our court has placed the inhibition against such contracts upon the higher and sounder ground that
the public, independent of the consent or concurrence of the parties, has
an interest that no inducement shall be offered to one man to take the
life of another.'

While Justice Brown seemingly rejected the wagering contract
theory as the reason for the requirement of insurable interest,
later cases have recognized it as co-existing with the public interest
that no inducement be offered to one man to take the life of
another.4
The best definition of what constitutes an insurable interest, in
general terms, is found in Texas Jurisprudence:
In the case of life insurance, an insurable interest exists only if there
be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties,
either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured. 5
On the basis of relationship, independent of pecuniary expectaAM. Jun., Insurance, § 353, p. 309.
Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894).
3 Id. at 291, 292, 28 S. W. at 275.
4 Wilke v. Finn, 39 S. W. 2d 836 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
5 24 Thx. Jut., Insurance, § 70, p. 767.
1 29
287
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iton, as constituting insurable interest, the Texas courts feel that
such relationship must be in the second degree.' However, where
the blood relationship fails to be of the second degree, the toodistant relative may still be held to have an insurable interest if
he or she also has a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit
in the continued existence of the insured.' The reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit that a creditor has in the continued
life of his debtor gives him an insurable interest in his debtor's
life, but the interest is limited to the amount of the debt.' By
statute a corporation, partnership, joint stock association, or a trust
estate doing business for profit has an insurable interest in the
life of any of its respective officers or stockholders; likewise, a
partnership or a member thereof has an insurable interest in the
life of any of the partners; and a charitable organization is
deemed to have an insurable interest in any individual
It is not proposed here to give an extensive review of the law
pertaining to insurable interest in Texas. But a situation will be
examined in which Texas courts have adopted a peculiar rule
differing from that entertained in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Proposed legislation which would modify this rule will
be discussed.
It is established, of course, that an individual has an insurable
interest in his own life. The element of wagering or any incentive
to take the life of another cannot be said to be present in this
instance. When a person takes out a policy of insurance on his
own life, the majority of courts allow the policy to be sold or
assigned, in spite of The fact that the assignee has no insurable
interest in the insured's life. The assignee may collect the full
amount of the proceeds of the policy. However, the assignment
may not be a cover for a wagering policy.1"
6 Wilton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 78 S. W. 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
7 Ibid.; Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 123 S. W. 2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
8 First Nat. Bank of Lockneyv. Livesay, 37 S. W. 2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931 ), ,f'd,

57 S. W. 2d 86 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
9 Texas Laws 1951, c. 491; TEXAS INSIJItANCE CODE OF 1951, aft. 3.49.
10 Rylander v. Allen, 125 Ga. 206, 53 S. E. 1032 (1906).

SOUTHI WESTERN LA W JOURNAL

[ Vol. 6

Texas courts, on the other hand, do not allow the assignee of a
policy to collect the proceeds, but limit the assignee's recovery to
expenditures made by him plus interest. And if the assignee has
made no expenditures, the assignment is void. 1
While the Texas rule thus restricts the sale or assignment of
life policies to persons having an insurable interest, such restriction seems unjustifiable in view of the case of Fletcher v. Wil.
liams." There Fletcher effected a policy on his life payable to
his father if alive at his death, or if not alive, then to his estate.
The father predeceased the insured. Thereafter the insured executed an instrument wherein he directed the insurance company
to pay the proceeds of the policy to Williams after his death. The
court held the instrument to be a will and gave the proceeds of
the policy to Williams even though he had no insurable interest.
The court said that the proceeds of the policy became a part of
the insured's estate immediately on his death and could, as in the
case of other property, be disposed of by will. It would seem
that what one can do indirectly by will he should be able to do
directly by an assignment.
Under Article 10.12 of the Texas Insurance Code of 1951
no longer is it necessary for one to have an insurable interest in the insured's life to be entitled to the proceeds of a
fraternal benefit certificate. In the case of Castillo v. Canales"
Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society issued a fraternal
benefit certificate to Miguel Villarreal, with Eloisa Sanchez the
named beneficiary. The by-laws of the Society permitted anyone
not prohibited by the laws of the State to be named beneficiary.
Subsequently the insured changed the beneficiary to Eloisa
Canales, she having no insurable interest in the insured's life. In
allowing Eloisa Canales to recover the proceeds of the certificate
the court said with reference to Article 10.12:
11 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 139 S. W. 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) er. ref.
12 66 S. W. 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) er. rel.
13 141 Tex. 479, 174 S. W. 2d 251 (1943).
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Prior to the adoption of the statute above referred to regulating
fraternal benefit societies, it was the public policy or "law" of this State,
with a few exceptions, that no one could be named as a beneficiary in
a life insurance policy who did not have an insurable interest in the
life of the insured. As previously stated, the Legislature had the right
to change this public policy. By the statute above referred to that public
policy was changed so that it then became the "law" of this State that
a member of a fraternal benefit society, with the consent of the society,
as evidenced by its laws could name as beneficiary in a life insurance
policy whomsoever he pleased, and regardless of whether the4 named
beneficiary had an insurable interest in the life of the insured.1
But why the distinction between fraternal policies and commercial policies? The only argument supporting the distinction is

that the brotherly love aspect is present among members of a fraternal society and therefore any incentive to take the life of the

insured would be negatived. But this argument is based on the
relationship existing among members of the society; it certainly
cannot be maintained that a designated beneficiary, a stranger to
the society, would feel any more brotherly love toward one insured
by a fraternal society than one insured by a commercial company.
If the beneficiary is going to murder the insured for the proceeds
of the policy, it is doubtful that he will give any consideration
to the fact that the insured was covered by a fraternal society
rather than a commercial company. Seemingly, any distinction as
to the requirement of insurable interest with relation to the two
types of policies is unwarranted. Whatever reasons motivated the
legislature to pass Article 10.12 with respect to fraternal societies
are just as valid with repect to commercial policies.
It should be further noted that the legislature has dissolved the
basis of the decision of Cheeves v. Anders by eliminating the
inducement to take the life of another. Article 21.23 of the
Texas Insurance Code of 1951 provides that the interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy shall be forfeited when the beneficiary willfully brings about the death of the insured.
14

Id. at 486, 174 S. W. 2d at 254.
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Aside from the above considerations, the Texas rule preventing
fr(c assignability of life policies greatly reduces their value in the
commercial world. The best example of the stifling effect of the
requirement is found in the use of insurance policies as collateral
security. In the majority of jurisdictions the value of life policies
as collateral security would be equal to their face value, while
in Texas the value is limited to the amount received by the insured
from the security holder.
In the regular session of the Fifty-second Texas Legislature a
bill 5 was introduced which would provide for certain changes in
the present rule of insurable interest. Section 1 deals with the
situation in which one takes out insurance on his own life. Thereunder, a person of legal age may apply for insurance on his own
life and designate any person or legal entity he chooses as
beneficiary. The insured may also assign or transfer any or all of
his rights, interests or benefits to anyone, before" or after the
policy is actually issued. The beneficiary or assignee, by the
statute, will be held to have an insurable interest in the life of
the insured. The effect of this section is to remove the existing
limits on those who may be designated as beneficiary or assignee
where the insured takes out the policy on his own life.
Section 2 deals with the situation in which one takes out insurance on the life of another. Here, each of the indicated persons
or legal entities will have an insurable interest in another's life,
provided, however, that the insured joins in the application for
the insurance or in any change of beneficiary:
(a) An employer in the life of any employee.
(b) An employee in the life of his or her employer, which
includes all individuals composing the employer.
(c) A stockholder of a closed corporation in the life of any
other stockholder of such corporation.
15 S. 58, H. R. 173. The bill was passed by the House but never came up for vote
in the Senate.
16 The assignment or transfer must be after application is made, but may be before
actual issuance of the policy.
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It can be seen that the effect of this section is merely to enlarge
the existing limits of those who may have an insurable interest
in the life of another.
Even with this proposed legislation, however, Texas would still
have the peculiar rule requiring an insurable interest both at the
time of issuance and at the time of termination of the policy. The
rule is based on the unsound premise that the primary purpose
of insurable interest is to lessen the temptation to take life. Thus,
Cheeves v. Anders would still be controlling, and, where a party
has taken out life insurance on his partner's life and the partnership is dissolved before the death of the insured, the policy would
be void as to the partner beneficiary, since he would not have an
insurable interest at the termination of the policy.
The proposed bill would alleviate the harshness of the present
doctrine as to beneficiaries and assignees on policies taken out by
the insured on his own life. By giving any person chosen by the
insured as beneficiary or assignee an insurable interest, Texas
would reach the same result as that prevailing in most of the
states, although by obviously indirect and inconsistent methods.
The passing of this legislation would be a step toward bringing
'Texas into accord with the more desirable majority view as to
insurable interest. It would not entirely mitigate the existing Texas
rule inasmuch as the insurable interest of the beneficiary might
cease to exist, thereby barring him from recovery of the proceeds.
With the enlargement of those who may have an insurable interest,
however, the bill should be sufficient, together with Articles 10.12
and 21.23 of the Insurance Code, to persuade the judiciary that the
intent of the Legislature is opposed to the present out-dated rule.
'The courts would then be in a position to overrule Cheeves v. Anders
in favor of the sounder majority rule.
Robert A. (Dean) Carlton, Jr.
Morton f. Hanlon.
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Addendum:
After this Comment was sent to press, Roberts v. Southwestern
Life Insurance Company 7 appeared in the advance sheets. In this
case a divorce settlement was entered into whereby it was agreed,
among other provisions, that the wife would continue to have an
insurable interest in the life of the husband after divorce, and that
the husband would have the wife irrevocably made beneficiary in
certain life insurance policies on his life. A judgment of divorce was
rendered with the settlement incorporated therein. Some four years
later the husband sought to change beneficiaries without the consent of the wife. The insurer brought suit for a declaratory judgment to establish the rights, status, and legal relationships of the
parties under the policies. The case was adjudged in favor of the
husband by the district court, holding that the wife did not have
an insurable interest in his life after the divorce.
The court of civil appeals reversed the decision on the ground
that the husband was estopped from asserting any right to change
beneficiaries, and also on the ground that a declaratory judgment
would not lie until the rights have become fixed, i.e., not until the
death of the insured.
By dicta Justice Young acknowledges that, under the present
rule of insurable interest in Texas, the wife did not have an insurable interest in the life of the husband after the divorce and that
the divorce judgment so stating was erroneous. However, this judgment was not void and, therefore, not subject to collateral attack
in the present action. Justice Young registers displeasure with the
present rule as laid down in Cheeves v. Anders. He points out that
inasmuch as Article 10.12 of the Texas Insurance Code of 1951
exempts fraternal societies from the rule, the burdening of all other
insurance companies with the restriction results in unjust discrimination within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, and Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution
of Texas. It is further pointed out in the opinion just as this Com",244 S. W. 2d 302 (TeN. Civ. App. 1951).

